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This paper explores price differences in the European Union (EU) pharmaceutical market, the EU’s
fifth largest industry.  With the aim of enhancing quality of life along with industry competitiveness
and R&D capability, many EU directives have been adopted to achieve a single EU-wide pharmaceutical
market.  Using annual 1994–2003 data on prices of molecules that treat cardiovascular disease, we
examine whether drug price dispersion has indeed decreased across five EU countries.  Hedonic regressions
show that over time, cross-country price differences between Germany and three of the four other
EU sample countries, France, Italy and Spain, have declined, with relative prices in all three as well
as the fourth country, UK, rising during the period.  We interpret this as evidence that the EU has come
closer to achieving a single pharmaceutical market in response to increasing European Commission
coordination efforts.
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1. Introduction: The EU Pharmaceutical Market 
Since 1985, one goal of the European Commission has been to achieve a single market 
for the pharmaceutical industry.  The purpose of harmonizing the European Union (EU) 
pharmaceutical market is not only to provide an environment favorable for pharmaceutical 
innovation and development, but also to improve consumer choices in pharmaceuticals at 
affordable prices without compromising quality, safety or efficacy (European Commission 
1998).  However, efforts have been hampered by differences across countries in health system 
characteristics such as government market power and regulation, reimbursement policies and 
patent processes.  Without a centralized approach to pharmaceuticals, EU members continue to 
apply their own individual solutions.  Such segmentation could increase costs for the industry 
and for patients if there are efficiency gains to having a more coordinated market. 
Variation in health system regimes across EU member states creates cross-country 
differences in prices for the same pharmaceutical product (Drummond 2003).  National 
governments often determine prices independently of market mechanisms.  Appendix table A-1 
lists differences in characteristics of the five major EU pharmaceutical markets.  While 
attempting to slow rapidly rising health care costs, national governments have implemented 
policies ranging from direct price controls and supply side cost containment regulations to 
demand side financial incentives, quantity controls and physician educational initiatives 
(Kanavos 2001;Mossialos, et al. 2004).  Strategies employed by the European Commission to 
narrow the divergence among the different national markets have included the organization of 
several round table discussions and the creation of the European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products (EMEA), European Patent Systems, the G10 Medicines Group and, most 
recently, the Pharmaceutical Forum.   2 
A particularly important issue has been parallel importing.  This occurs when a drug is 
purchased in another country and then sold in the home country, at a price higher than the 
purchase price but lower than the prevailing home country price (Darba and Rovira 1998).  EU 
parallel imports of pharmaceuticals were estimated at €4.265 billion in 2003, representing a 
dramatic increase from a decade earlier and 5% of overall market value (EFPIA 2005).  In 2005, 
one of every 17 prescriptions in the United Kingdom was filled with a parallel import, 
accounting for about one-seventh of total sales (The Association of the British Pharmaceutical 
Industry 2007).  This implies that arbitrage opportunities have persisted despite efforts to 
coordinate the market, perhaps aided by lower repackaging costs in conjunction with EMEA 
harmonization of dosage and labeling requirements.  At the same time, parallel imports should 
encourage pharmaceutical price convergence by dragging down prices in countries where 
pharmaceuticals are more expensive (OECD 2000;Towse 1998).  For instance, Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004) found that the prices of drugs subject to competition from parallel imports fell 
relative to those of other drugs by 12–19%. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate recent trends in EU pharmaceutical price 
differences.  Our analysis employs molecule-level IMS Health data on drugs that treat selected 
cardiovascular diseases, covering the five countries with the largest pharmaceutical markets in 
the EU over the 1994–2003 period.  We proceed in three steps.  First, we estimate trends in 
bilateral price differences using quasi-hedonic regressions that control for variation in drug 
characteristics.  Second, we examine the contribution of various product and market 
characteristics to price dispersion using a quasi-hedonic regression that permits intercepts and 
parameters to differ across both countries and time.  Third, we decompose price differences into 
portions attributable to quality and market competition, along with an unexplained residual,   3 
using parameter estimates from the fully-interacted hedonic model. 
 
 2. Data 
2.1. Characteristics 
International pharmaceutical price comparisons, which have been the subject of several 
empirical studies, are confronted with various practical difficulties regarding the utilization of 
price data.  One problem is that the packaging unit in the country that serves as the basis for 
comparison might be uncommon or even unavailable in other countries (Berndt 2000;Berndt, et 
al. 2002).  Another problem, which is mitigated in recent data on EU countries that use the euro 
(€) as the local currency, is how to standardize different units of exchange.  Conversions are 
typically made using Purchasing Power Parities (PPP), but the applicability of the general PPP to 
the health care sector is variable and uncertain.  A third problem is the decision regarding which 
set of medications to examine (Barry, et al. 2004).  Yet another question is whether to further 
normalize the price according to the WHO-defined daily dose (DDD), which assumes that 
standard treatment duration is uniform across countries (Danzon and Chao 2000). 
Danzon (1999) recognized that samples consisting solely of packs sold in different 
countries with the same ingredient, manufacturer, brand name, dosage form, size and strength 
would exclude generic and over-the-counter (OTC) products.  Because generics and OTCs likely 
serve as substitutes for originator and prescription drugs, respectively, their omission could yield 
unrepresentative samples (Hellerstein 1998), a problem potentially exacerbated by not including 
all forms and strengths (Ellison, et al. 1997;Scherer 1993;Scherer 2000).  The solution developed 
by Danzon (1999) is to identify a drug by its active ingredient, i.e. molecule, and anatomic 
therapeutic category (ATC) without regard to manufacturer or brand name.     4 
Likewise, we combine all forms of a given molecule, including generics and licensed 
products, to form a weighted average price per molecule-ATC.  Ignoring differences between 
identical molecules within the same ATC is seemingly less problematic than prospectively 
introducing selection bias by systematically excluding various substitutes, forms, pack sizes and 
strengths.  We use the three-digit, i.e. third level, ATC, although results change little if we 
disregard ATC and identify each drug simply by its molecule. 
This paper employs data from IMS Health, an international pharmaceutical consulting 
company that collects sales data on more than one million products from over 3,000 companies 
in more than 100 countries.  The IMS Health measure that meets the criterion of being available 
for all dosage forms and strengths is the IMS Standard Unit (SU).  The SU defines a single dose 
as one tablet or capsule, five liquid milliliters (i.e. one teaspoon), or one ampoule or vial of an 
injected product (IMS 2005).  Prices are converted to euros by IMS Health using constant 
exchange rates, which minimizes effects of exchange rate fluctuations.  A country’s SU price for 
a molecule-ATC is its volume-weighted average price per dose over all presentations, including 
generic, licensed, OTC, and parallel imported products (Danzon and Furukawa 2003). 
 
2.2. Samples 
We analyze retail prices of drugs that treat cardiovascular disease (CVD), the third-
leading cause of death in OECD countries.  Importantly, the effectiveness of CVD drug therapies 
is short-term, so patients must continually receive a treatment to maintain its health benefits.  
Our sample consists of the eight CVD drugs studied by Dickson and Jacobzone (2003), which 
cover both newer and older innovations that form the core of pharmacotherapy for CVD. 
The five countries in the sample are Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Italy, Spain,   5 
and France.  Besides having the largest pharmaceutical production and sales in the EU-15 
(OECD 2003), these five countries are the largest pharmaceutical markets in the world apart 
from the US and Japan (Pammolli, et al. 2004).  Imposing the previously described restrictions, 
our sample would contain 259 distinct single molecules, representing 658 molecule-by-country 
cells during the 1994–2003 period: 119 for France, 177 for Germany, 135 for Italy, 119 for Spain 
and 108 for UK.  An additional constraint, which unfortunately is substantial, accompanies the 
necessity of choosing a baseline country with which to compare the others.  We choose Germany 
for this role because, as listed above, it contains the most molecules by a wide margin.  Our 
sample is thus limited to the 124 single molecules – 86 each for France and UK, 102 for Italy and 
91 for Spain – that bilaterally match with Germany. 
 
2.3. Preliminary Price Comparisons 
As shown in Table 1, the average SU price over all molecules and years ranges from 
€0.24 in Spain and €0.25 in Italy and France to €0.60 in Germany and €1.36 in UK.  Table 2 and 
the accompanying figure depict average yearly SU prices for each country relative to that of 
Germany, reiterating that prices are substantially higher in UK than Germany while prices in the 
other three countries are substantially lower.  After decreasing slightly in the latter 1990s, the 
France-Germany price differential increases from –55% in 2000 to –72% in 2003.  Similarly, the 
Italy-Germany price gap rises from –63% to –71% over the period, while the Spain-Germany 
price difference rises from –68% to –78%.  In comparison, the UK-Germany price wedge 
expands considerably during the period, to almost 200% by 2003. 
These trends seemingly indicate that pharmaceutical prices across countries are 
diverging, rather than converging as if spurred by the achievement of a single market.  However,   6 
the table 2 prices have not yet been adjusted for variation in the set of molecules sold in each 
country.  Some of these price differentials might be attributable to systematic differences in the 
characteristics of drugs available in some countries but not others. 
 
3. Differences in Prices Adjusted by Quality and Market Competition 
3.1. Quasi-Hedonic Price Regressions 
When making international price comparisons, cross-country differences in product 
specifications pose an obstacle (Kravis and Lipsey 1969).  Products serving the same purpose 
might have different attributes in different countries.  For example, a Honda Accord might have 
varying horsepower across countries, or come with automatic transmission in some countries and 
manual transmission in others (Goldberg and Verboven 2004).  In our case, the forms, pack sizes 
and strength levels in which drugs are sold vary across countries, depending on demand and 
cultural characteristics.  To address this issue, we use hedonic regressions.  
As Danzon and Chao (2000) note, our price models are more appropriately termed quasi-
hedonic regressions for three reasons.  First, while the standard hedonic model assumes that price 
determinants differ randomly across products, pharmaceutical prices are expected to differ 
systematically across countries, reflecting differences in health care regimes.  Because some 
price variation across countries is explained by factors other than observed product 
characteristics and that change very little over time, the models include country-specific 
intercepts.  Second, hedonic regression estimates the marginal contribution of each characteristic 
to the value of a product (Sirmans et al. 2005).  However, pharmaceutical market imperfections 
drive a wedge between price and marginal value.  These include deviations between patient and 
physician preferences, moral hazard from insurance coverage, and monopsony power of national   7 
health systems on the demand side, along with patent restrictions providing monopoly power to 
producers and marketing restrictions through drug approval and testing requirements on the 
supply side (Capri and Levaggi 2005).  Third, drug prices also vary across countries because of 
time-varying differences in regulatory and reimbursement environments.  To address this, our 
models specify market competition measures, which would not appear in a standard hedonic 
regression, as additional explanatory variables. 
 
3. 2. Specification of the Quasi-Hedonic Price Regression 
Adapted from Danzon and Chao (2000), our model uses log transformations of product 
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In equation 1, for molecule k in country j and year t, P is the price per SU and Xc is a quality or 
market characteristic.  The d are indicators for country, year or molecule, while u is the 
regression error.  The parameter of primary interest, λj,t, estimates the average bilateral price 
difference in time t between country j and Germany, which is omitted from the country indicator 
vector, across molecules.  This price gap is net of variation induced by differences across quality 
and market characteristics, molecules, time or countries. 
Our preferred specification treats the molecule-specific intercepts as fixed effects by 
including molecule indicators on the right-hand side.  Besides the molecule quality and market 
characteristics that appear in equation (1), drug prices also reflect therapeutic value and 
convenience, attributes that have intrinsic value but are not observable.  If these are time-
invariant and molecule-specific, the fixed effects model is appropriate.  An alternative approach 
is to hold constant ATC indicators as proxies for market and regulatory factors that vary by ATC   8 
category.  Because these are time-invariant, however, they are not identified in the fixed effects 
model.  We therefore also estimate a random effects model.  This strategy accounts for the 
molecule-specific intercepts in the error term, and thus the regression standard errors, but does so 
by invoking the questionable assumption that these intercepts are uncorrelated with the molecule 
characteristics as well as the indicators for molecule, country and year. 
 
3.2.1. Description of Variables  
Table 1 lists the variables along with their descriptive statistics.  We categorize the first 
five variables in the table as quality characteristics.  Molecule age is the number of years since 
the first product launch of molecule k in country j.  The sample mean is 20 years, ranging from 
18 in Spain to 22 in UK.  We expect molecule age to be inversely related with price, since newer 
treatments are typically introduced precisely because they are more effective, and thus have 
higher value, than older treatments.  Most molecules in our CVD ATCs were on the market prior 
to the sample period.   
Strength is the average grams of active ingredient per SU and ranges from 0.14 in France 
and UK to 0.23 in Spain, with an overall mean of 0.17.  Stronger molecules are presumably more 
effective, holding constant technological developments for which molecule age proxy, implying 
a positive association between strength and price.   
Form code is the number of different product formulations for each molecule, and is 
intended to reflect choice and convenience available to patients, suggesting a positive 
relationship with price.  Forms include different types of tablets (e.g. film, chewable, gel), 
capsules, ampoules, powders, drops, syrups, syringes, and liquids, along with different strengths 
and pack sizes.  In 2003, for example, the molecule metoprolol (in ATC C7A) was available in   9 
118 different formulations in Germany.  The mean is 6, ranging from 3 in France, Italy and Spain 
to 12 in Germany.   
Pack size is the number of SUs averaged over all packs in a molecule, converted to 
standard units according to IMS (2006) guidelines.  If manufacturers achieve economies of scale 
in packaging, price and pack size will be inversely related.  The average SU pack size ranges 
from 28 in Italy to 85 in Germany, with an overall mean of 56. 
The final quality characteristic, diffused molecules, is simply the number of sample 
countries in which the molecule is available, and thus varies only between 2 and 5.  If drug 
manufacturers market a product wherever its marginal revenue exceeds its marginal cost, 
diffusion will increase as marginal revenue rises or marginal cost declines.  Net of institutional 
differences captured by country fixed effects, therefore, diffusion could reflect either higher 
therapeutic values or lower costs, making the theoretical relationship with price unclear.  
However, if the other characteristics held constant in the model are correlated mostly with 
therapeutic value rather than cost, a negative coefficient on diffusion will emerge. 
The last two rows list the time-varying market characteristics included in the fixed effects 
model.  Both reflect increased availability of substitutes and should thereby be negatively related 
with price.  Generic competitors are manufacturers of products containing the molecule, 
including originators, licensees, parallel imports and generics.  The average is eight in Germany, 
but only three in the other four countries.  Therapeutic substitute molecules are competitors that 
are chemically distinct but used to treat the same indication, i.e. the number of molecules within 
the same ATC3.  On average, Germany again has the most, 22, while UK has the least, 13. 
 
3. 3. Empirical Results of the Quasi-Hedonic Price Model   10 
3.3.1. Quality and Market Characteristics 
Table 3 contains the results of fixed and random effects estimation of equation (1).  
Because all variables are specified in log form, each coefficient is interpreted as the elasticity of 
price with respect to the corresponding quality or market characteristic.  Most regressors have 
the expected sign and are statistically significant.  Except for molecule age, which in the fixed 
effects model is identified only through the nonlinearity introduced by the log transformation, the 
fixed and random effects models yield similar conclusions. 
The average SU price rises with product strength.  This is not surprising, because 
reference pricing based on product attributes, which is widely employed in the sample countries, 
incorporates a positive relationship between strength and therapeutic effectiveness that 
presumably must exist to justify selling different drug strengths.  The coefficients imply that a 
10% increase in molecule strength raises price by 2–3%, with the more conservative estimate 
coming from the random effects model. 
The molecule age coefficient in the fixed effect model, which is near zero and highly 
insignificant, conveys little information because within-molecule age varies separately from the 
fixed year and molecule effects only via the non-linearity of the log transformation.  An 
advantage of the random effects model, therefore, is its utilization of cross-molecule variation to 
estimate the relationship between price and molecule age.  The significantly negative coefficient 
is consistent with the notion that relative therapeutic value declines with age as more effective 
new products enter the market.  A 10% increase in age reduces price by about 2%. 
The number of formulations is insignificantly related to price in both models.  Price 
decreases significantly with pack size, though, as implied by economies of scale in packaging, 
EMEA packaging and labeling regulations, and use in reference pricing calculations.  Both   11 
models imply that the price of a 10% larger pack size will be lower by about 4%.   
Consistent with earlier studies, price also declines significantly with the number of 
diffused molecules.  The implied elasticity is nearly –0.4 with fixed effects, but only around –0.2 
with random effects. 
Among the market characteristics, only generic competition is significantly related with 
price, and only in the random effects model.  Generic competition reduces price, as expected, but 
by well less than 1% for each 10% increase.  The impact of generic competition might have been 
mitigated by the addition of generic substitution to the regulatory systems of many EU countries 
by the late 1990s.  In 1993, the EU introduced legislation allowing supplementary patent 
certificates (SPCs) that, analogous to the Roche-Bolar provision of the Waxman-Hatch Act in the 
US, allows generic manufacturers to develop versions of products that are still under patent 
protection.  SPC applications must go through a specific national patent office, giving member 
countries the opportunity to separately address the issue.  In Germany and UK, generic suppliers 
can formulate and test products and complete product review in another country while the patent 
is active, which can substantially reduce the time between patent expiration and generic launch.  
For example, German generics have been launched the day following patent expiration.  In 
France, meanwhile, required documentation cannot be submitted for review until after patent 
expiration, delaying the launch of generic competition for up to five years. 
The number of therapeutic substitute molecules is not significantly related to price, as 
opposed to the inverse relationship that is expected and that Danzon and Chao (2000) obtain in 
their data.  Our result is not attributable to the inclusion of fixed effects, since the coefficient is 
very similar in the random effects model.  Substitute molecules with a higher price might not 
receive reimbursement, and substitution is not always possible in regulated countries because of   12 
prescribing or consumption preferences. 
The therapeutic substitute entry lag, in years, is a time-invariant market characteristic 
identified only in the random effects model.  Its coefficient is positive but insignificant. 
 
3.3.2. Quality Adjusted Standard Unit Price Differentials  
An important purpose of the equation (1) regression is estimating the country-by-year 
interaction coefficients.  These represent country-specific price trends that are unrelated to 
quality and market characteristics, molecule identity, time-invariant country-specific factors and 
temporal factors common to the sample countries.  Table 4 shows the percentage differences in 
price, relative to Germany, implied by these interaction coefficients. 
Over time, price differences persist, but decline in magnitude.  This likely reflects 
increasing market integration for several reasons, including parallel importing and greater 
monitoring of cross-country price differences by the EU Commission in an effort to achieve a 
single pharmaceutical market.   
Prices in France, Italy, and Spain move similarly, consistent with growing comparability 
of their pharmaceutical industries and regulatory environments.  For each drug, the French 
government negotiates a single price targeted to the EU average.  Changes implemented in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s include increased promotion of generic substitution by pharmacists, 
financial incentives for patients to visit general practitioners rather than more expensive 
specialists, and price cuts on expensive drugs such as Zocor.  Spain likewise has fixed drug 
prices and uses international comparisons for reference pricing of generics, with prices set 10–
50% below those of the original brand in order to induce branded drug price reductions.  Drugs 
on a negative list are not reimbursed, and in 2001 price cuts of 15% were imposed for a variety   13 
of molecules. Italy’s regulatory approach is similar, with fixed pricing and cost-effectiveness 
analysis of in-patent drugs.  Prices of both branded and generic drugs are based on those in other 
EU countries, and drugs with identical or therapeutically comparable pharmaceutical forms must 
have the same price per unit.  In 1999, price cuts of 15% were implemented for many products, 
and the following year prices on unprotected branded drugs were reduced another 5%.  
Once quality and market characteristics are held constant, prices are higher in Germany 
than in the other countries, including UK.  Health care systems in Germany and UK, though 
distinct, are alike in several respects.  Although Germany is the only sample country with 
unrestricted in-patent drug prices, a reference pricing system governs older products, and 
pharmaceutical budgets and spending caps have been implemented since the 1980s.  Health 
insurance reimburses all pharmaceutical products not on the negative list, and both parallel 
imports and generics are well-established.  UK regulates in-patent drugs using cost-effectiveness 
analysis and profit control.  Government negotiates prices of licensed and branded drugs with the 
pharmaceutical industry, and prices of generics are now also regulated because of recent 
increases.  Parallel imports from elsewhere in Europe are also encouraged. 
 
4. Further Analysis of Price Differentials: Explained vs. Unexplained  
This section expands on the equation (1) model to estimate how the price effects of 
molecule characteristics vary across countries and over time.  For each country, these parameters 
are used to partition the trends in bilateral price differences with Germany into a portion 
attributable to differences in mean values of the quality and market characteristics, with the 
remainder attributable to differences in parameter values or fixed country effects.  
   14 
4.1 Fully-Interacted Model  
4.1.1. Specification  
The new model generalizes equation (1) by allowing molecule characteristics to have 
different effects in different countries and years.  This is done by adding interactions between 
characteristics and country fixed effects, year fixed effects and country-by-year fixed effects.  
The updated model is thus 
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Variables and parameters are denoted as in equation (1), and ρ, γ, and θ are the coefficients on 
the new interactions between the molecule characteristics and the country/year indicators.  Net 
implicit prices for molecule characteristics are β for Germany in 1994, (β + γt) for Germany in 
year t = 1995–2003, (β + ρ j) for other countries j in 1994, and (β + γt + ρ j + θj,t) for other 
countries j in year t = 1995–2003. 
 
4.1.2 Empirical Results 
The estimated elasticities of price with respect to quality and market characteristics are 
summarized in table 5 for 1994 and 2003.  Coefficient directions are largely consistent with our 
earlier results, although magnitudes sometimes differ substantially across countries. 
 Price is increasing in strength per SU, as expected, in all countries and years.  Strength 
elasticities are largest in Germany, possibly because strength is directly used to determine 
relative prices, and larger in UK than remaining countries.  Molecule age is significantly 
negatively related to price in France, Italy and Spain, in each of which fixed prices prospectively   15 
encourage renegotiation of lower prices as molecules age (Mossialos et al. 2004, Seget 2003), 
with the magnitude rising over time in Spain but falling over time in France and Italy.  The 
number of formulations significantly increases price in France during the first half of the period 
and in Italy and Spain throughout.  Again, with fixed prices, introduction of a new formation 
might provide an opportunity for manufacturers to renegotiate prices upward. The number of 
diffused molecules significantly reduces price in Italy, perhaps reflecting the use of average EU 
price comparisons, and UK, which evaluates treatments in terms of both clinical and cost 
effectiveness.  Price significantly decreases with pack size in all countries and years, which is not 
surprising since, for instance, patient co-payment is based on pack size in Germany and 
maximum price is based on maximum pack size in UK. 
Among the market variables, therapeutic substitute molecule availability affects price 
negatively in Italy and Spain, in which prices are negotiated between suppliers, physicians and 
pharmacists.  Competition, under therapeutic reference pricing, decreases drug prices (Brekke, et 
al. 2007).  Like pack size, the number of generic competitors significantly reduces prices in all 
countries and years.  The impact is smallest in France and Spain, possibly reflecting regulations 
on generics and limitations on price negotiations, and largest in UK and Germany, which had 
unrestricted pricing and significant price reductions in the late 1990s. 
 
4.2. Decomposition of characteristics 
This part of the analysis uses the Oaxaca (1973) decomposition method to explain the 
price differences using the vector of determinants in equation (2).  Specifically, we seek to 
establish how much of the price difference between each country and Germany in a given year is 
specific to observed quality and market characteristics.  We decompose each price differential   16 
into three parts: one attributable to differences in the magnitudes of quality characteristics, a 
second attributable to differences in the magnitudes of market characteristics, and a third residual 
component which represents the difference between the overall price differential and the first 
two parts, including differences in the quality and market characteristic parameter values across 
countries and years as well as differences in the country fixed effects. 
 
4.2.1 Specification  
The ratio of mean price of a molecule in country j relative to that in Germany, i.e. the 
approximate percentage price differential, can be written as 
GR GR j j GR j GR j X X P P P P ln ln ln ln ) / ln(  
Inserting the term ( j GR j GR X X ln ln ) into the right-hand side and distributing accordingly 
yields the expression 
(3)             j GR J GR j GR GR j X X X P P ln ) ( ) ln (ln ) / ln( ,  
adopted from Danzon and Chao (2000).  The first term ) ln (ln GR j GR X X , called the explained 
component, represents the difference in mean characteristics of the sample of molecules in 
country j compared with Germany, evaluated using the regression parameters for Germany.  In 
other words, this component is the portion of the price gap attributable to differences in average 
characteristics between the comparison country and Germany.  The second term 
j GR j X ln ) ( , called the unexplained component, represents the difference in regression 
parameters compared to Germany, evaluated using the characteristics in country j.  This 
unexplained component measures country-specific price differences arising from differences 
across markets in how molecule characteristics are “treated.”  If the coefficients of these 
characteristics are the same for comparison country j and Germany, the unexplained component   17 
equals zero, implying that price differences related to molecule characteristics are attributable 
entirely to differences in the characteristics themselves.  Country intercepts then estimate the 
residual effects not explained by values or effects of the molecule characteristics. 
 
4.2.2 Empirical Results: Quality vs. Competition Characteristics  
Table 6 summarizes the results of the decompositions, using the parameter estimates 
from the fully-interacted model (2) in section 4.1.  For each country relative to Germany, the 
overall log price difference in each year is disaggregated into the components explained by 
quality and market characteristics and a total of the three unexplained components, i.e. related to 
differences in quality and market regression parameters as well as country-specific intercepts.   
During 1994–2003, prices in each of the other four countries have risen relative to 
Germany.  For countries other than UK, prices are still lower than in Germany, meaning that the 
relative price increase represents a convergence in prices.  The price difference with Germany 
has decreased by about 40% for France, 50% for Spain and 65% for Italy.  Meanwhile, the UK 
price has risen from 16% less than Germany to 33% greater.  The timing of relative price 
movements also differed somewhat across countries.  In Italy, price convergence was steady 
starting in 1995.  In France, convergence was concentrated during 1994–1997, as the price gap 
with Germany actually increased over the next five years before falling again in 2003.  Spain is 
similar, with convergence occurring primarily during 1994–1997 and 2001–2003.  In UK, prices 
increased substantially in 1997, 1999 and 2003, making up for a temporary decline in 2002. 
Much of this price convergence is predicted by a relative decrease in German drug 
“quality,” i.e. changes in values of quality characteristics that led to prices in Germany falling 
compared with other countries.  For example, of the 18 percentage point convergence in price   18 
between France and Germany, 16 percentage points are attributable to improved quality relative 
to Germany.  Analogous totals for the other countries are 34 of 44 percentage points in Italy, 19 
of 33 points in Spain and 22 of 49 points in UK.  Thus, it appears that pharmaceutical companies 
have been largely responsible for EU drug price convergence through lowering the quality of 
their products in Germany relative to other countries.  This is ironic, as prices in the other 
countries at the start of the period were lower than in Germany in spite of Germany having the 
lowest predicted price based on quality characteristics. 
For all countries, competition has been increasing relative to Germany, in the sense that 
market factors predict comparatively falling rather than rising prices in the other countries.  
However, these effects are small, i.e. 10 percentage points in France and Spain and only 5–6 
points in UK and Italy. 
Unexplained factors, therefore, account for (more than) the rest of the convergence in 
prices, varying in importance from 13 percentage points in France and 17 points in Italy to 23 
points in Spain and 33 points in UK.  The unexplained component, which is assumed to capture 
the net effect of country specific industry dynamics such as insurance coverage, medical norms 
and reimbursement incentives, was already the reason prices were higher in Germany than 
elsewhere.   
From the detailed decomposition estimates, not presented here but available from the 
authors, we can further disaggregate the sources of the price changes predicted by each set of 
factors.  Note that based on equation 3 above, “explained” price changes include not only 
changes in mean characteristic values but also changes in the Germany regression parameters, 
because we separately estimate equation 3 each sample year.  Other than a 15% increase in 
molecule age, characteristic means changed very little over the period.     19 
The “explained” changes are thus attributable primarily to changes in the Germany 
regression coefficients.  These are driven almost entirely by increases, in absolute value, of the 
negative coefficient of a specific quality factor, pack size.  Multiplied by the essentially 
unchanged cross-country differences in mean pack size, this predicts relative price increases of 
18 percentage points in France, 25 points in Italy, 19 points in Spain and 43 points in UK.  These 
predict changes represent nearly three-quarters of predicted price convergence from quality 
changes in Italy, 100% in Spain and effectively all of the predicted overall price convergence in 
France and UK.  In particular, 30–60% of these impacts, depending on the country, reflect the 
change in the Germany pack size regression coefficient just from 1999 to 2000.  This suggests a 
change in the reference pricing formula in Germany, starting in 2000, in which price discounts 
for larger pack sizes were increased. 
Accounting for changes in relative prices attributable to specific “unexplained” factors is 
more difficult.  Increasingly positive pack size coefficients in every country besides Germany are 
partly responsible, but this is much more important in France than the other countries.  Also, 
changes in each other factor, with the exception of form code, play a central role in at least one 
country.  In France and Italy, relative price increases predicted from changes in unexplained 
quality factors are mostly offset by large decreases predicted from changes in the residual term, 
with relatively little change from unexplained competition factors.  But in Spain and UK, 
residual changes predict further relative price increases, whereas unexplained competition factors 
predict declining prices. 
By the end of the period, prices continued to be lower in France, Italy and Spain than in 
Germany because the negative effect of unexplained factors swamped the positive impact of 
higher quality.  However, price gaps had shrunk both because observed quality differentials had   20 
increased and unexplained differentials had fallen.  Meanwhile, prices were higher in UK by 
2003 partly because unexplained factors now predicted higher, rather than lower, prices.  Higher 
quality relative to Germany was an even more important factor, although quality was lower in 
UK than in the other three countries. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze price differences across molecules that treat 
cardiovascular disease across selected European Union countries during 1994–2003.  Although 
pharmaceutical prices are regulated in all five countries that we study, specific regulations vary.  
For instance, in Italy, France and Spain, prices are regulated at launch and subsequently are 
revised downwards over the life cycle of the drug.  In contrast, pharmaceutical companies in the 
UK and Germany are free to set prices at launch, although prices cannot move freely throughout 
the life of the drug. 
Our data include only cardiovascular disease drugs in certain therapeutic categories that 
were sold in the five countries we study and are matched to one country in particular, Germany. 
Similarly, our data set extends for only a ten year period.  Caution must be exercised, therefore, 
in generalizing our findings to molecules designed to treat other diseases in other countries and 
more recent years.   
Notwithstanding these limitations, three main conclusions can be drawn from our study.  
First, drug prices in Germany fall relative to prices in other countries over 1994–2003.  For 
countries besides UK, these relative price changes are interpreted as evidence of price 
convergence.  Second, several observed drug characteristics affect prices in the expected way.  
Third, drug quality in Germany has fallen relative to the other countries, contributing to price   21 
convergence.  These results suggest that although price differences still exist because of 
diverging health system regulations, market integration and continued coordination efforts of the 
European Commission are moving the EU towards a single pharmaceutical market.   22 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable  Germany  France 
United 
Kingdom  Italy  Spain  Overall 










































































































































































































Each cell contains the mean in the top row, unconditional standard deviation in parentheses in the second row, 
within-molecule standard deviation in brackets in the third row, and number of observations in the bottom row.   26 
Table 2: Fixed Local Euro Standard Unit (SU) Prices, Normalized to Germany 
 
 










France -60.82% -59.67% -60.11% -59.92% -56.27% -55.36% -63.98% -67.34% -69.98% -72.32%
United Kingdom 84.50% 106.25%171.64%108.41%120.35%137.51%147.61%143.55%144.36%184.52%
Italy  -63.40% -66.51% -64.39% -59.83% -57.65% -56.12% -63.51% -65.37% -67.94% -70.99%
Spain -67.92% -66.70% -67.58% -66.20% -55.00% -54.17% -63.61% -63.49% -66.36% -78.44%
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  27 




The dependent variable is the log of the SU euro price.  Parentheses contain standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are adjust for clustering by molecule.  Brackets contain p-values of joint F-statistics.  *, ** 
and *** reflect significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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ATC Dummies   No  Yes 
[0.0000] 
N  3,263  2,480 
R
2 (Within)  0.4078  0.3689   28 
Table 4: Quality Adjusted Bilateral (Country vs. Germany) Price Differences (%), 
Normalized to Germany 
 












FR -58.94 -51.26 -50.41 -48.36 -48.28 -47.18 -46.9 -48.73 -41.98 -40.93
ITY -64.37 -60.88 -59.29 -56.82 -55.75 -54.05 -53.1 -52.04 -46.05 -45.96
UK -27.81 -17.14 -19.73 -16.09 -12.87 -8.051 -11.52 -16.66 -12.21 -9.754
SPN -67.23 -60.12 -59.98 -58.15 -58.25 -57.06 -57.84 -58.16 -53.55 -51.11
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  29 
Table 5: Net Implicit Price Elasticities for Characteristics, 1994 & 2003 
(p-values in parentheses) 
 
Quality/Market 
Characteristics  Year  Germany  France  U.K.  Italy  Spain 
Strength  1994  0.3023*    
(0.0000) 
0.2678*   
(0.0004) 
0.3071*     
(0.0020) 
0.2487*    
(0.0022) 
0.3073*      
(0.0017) 
  2003  0.2560*    
(0.0004) 
0.2441*     
(0.0005) 
0.4453*     
(0.0000) 
0.2527*       
(0.0035) 
0.3221*     
(0.0011) 
             
Molecule Age  1994  0.1248     
(0.190) 
-0.1784*      
(0.0038) 
0.0013    
(0.4035) 
-0.1709*      
(0.0045) 
-0.2552*     
(0.0000) 
  2003  0.0894***     
(0.0668) 
-0.0923**      
(0.0163) 
-0.0176    
(0.6874) 
-0.0427**     
(0.0178) 
-0.3228*       
(0.0000) 
             
Form Codes  1994  -0.0987    
(0.222) 
0.1765***     
(0.0878) 
0.0520     
(0.3541) 
0.2487**     
(0.0260) 
0.2460*     
(0.0061) 
  2003  -0.1430     
(0.2833) 
0.0931      
(0.1370) 
-0.0554       
(0.4672) 
0.2474*      
(0.0060) 
0.2586*       
(0.0046) 
             
Diffused 
Molecules 
1994  0.1160      
(0.222) 
-0.3664     
(0.1511) 
-0.9221**      
(0.0134) 
-0.3000**      
(0.0453) 
-0.0645   
(0.4265) 
  2003  -0.0819   
(0.1206) 
-0.1931      
(0.1086) 
-0.7649**      
(0.0108) 
-0.3622**     
(0.0178) 
-0.1048     
(0.2324) 
             
Packsize   1994  -0.3605*     
(0.001) 
-0.6541*    
(0.0000) 
-0.3960*      
(0.0000) 
-0.4454*     
(0.0001) 
-0.2347*     
(0.0016) 
  2003  -0.5677*    
(0.0002) 
-0.4504*       
(0.0000) 
-0.4560*         
(0.0000) 
-0.5527*       
(0.0000) 
-0.3676*      
(0.0002) 
             
Generic 
Competition 
1994  -0.1240**    
(0.039) 
0.0273     
(0.1074) 
-0.1858**      
(0.0412) 
-0.0248    
(0.1165) 
0.0225      
(0.1164) 
  2003  -0.1305**    
(0.0121) 
-0.0378**     
(0.0284) 
-0.1841**       
(0.0154) 
-0.1892*     
(0.0041) 
-0.0969*    
(0.0096) 
             
Therapeutic 
Substitute Mol.  
1994  0.2718***      
(0.084) 
0.0025    
(0.1817) 
0.0929    
(0.2214) 
-0.2447**      
(0.0562) 
-0.1954    
(0.1003) 
 
2003  0.5084**      
(0.0520) 
0.1468      
(0.1231) 
-0.3557**    
(0.0318) 
0.0766**      
(0.0139) 
-0.2204**      
(0.0269) 
             
*, ** and *** reflect p<0.01, p<0.05 and p<0.10   30 
 
Table 6: Decompositions-Explained (Average Characteristics) vs. Unexplained (Implicit Price Effect) 
FRANCE vs. GERMANY   1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
Explained                     
Quality  0.5298  0.4530  0.4195  0.4742  0.5244  0.5456  0.6179  0.6236  0.6258  0.6904 
Competition   0.0546  0.1419  0.1534  0.1060  0.0310  0.0018  0.0457  0.0318  0.0097  -0.0447 
Unexplained   -1.0383  -0.9879  -0.9270  -0.8798  -0.8746  -0.8467  -0.9516  -0.9938  -1.0209  -0.9170 
Total: Log of Observed Price Ratios  -0.4539  -0.3929  -0.3542  -0.2996  -0.3192  -0.2993  -0.2880  -0.3384  -0.3854  -0.2712 
ITALY vs. GERMANY                      
Explained                     
Quality  0.4941  0.4361  0.4280  0.4781  0.5831  0.5924  0.7041  0.7078  0.7325  0.8313 
Competition  0.0202  0.0980  0.1096  0.0792  0.0252  0.0466  0.0544  0.0364  0.0276  -0.0400 
Unexplained  -1.1975  -1.2192  -1.1387  -1.0736  -1.0629  -1.0364  -1.1344  -1.0853  -1.0269  -1.0307 
Total: Log of Observed Price Ratios  -0.6831  -0.6851  -0.6011  -0.5162  -0.4546  -0.3974  -0.3758  -0.3411  -0.2668  -0.2394 
U.K. vs. GERMANY                      
Explained                     
Quality  0.0578  -0.1388  -0.1181  -0.0215  0.0212  0.0788  0.2200  0.2329  0.2433  0.2745 
Competition   0.0048  0.1109  0.1094  0.0660  0.0005  0.0235  0.0215  -0.0141  -0.0044  -0.0498 
Total Unexplained  -0.2252  -0.1286  -0.1774  -0.1047  -0.0856  0.1400  0.0807  -0.0048  -0.3506  0.1012 
Total: Log of Observed Price Ratios  -0.1626  -0.1565  -0.1861  -0.0603  -0.0639  0.2423  0.3221  0.2141  -0.1117  0.3259 
SPAIN vs. GERMANY                      
Explained                     
Quality  0.4881  0.4111  0.3813  0.4450  0.5324  0.5532  0.6144  0.6234  0.6172  0.6818 
Competition  0.0151  0.0815  0.0968  0.0618  0.0196  0.0286  0.0154  -0.0117  -0.0163  -0.0833 
Total Unexplained  -1.2050  -1.1665  -1.1111  -1.0310  -1.0922  -1.0557  -1.1155  -1.1158  -1.0585  -0.9740 
Total: Log of Observed Price Ratios  -0.7017  -0.6739  -0.6330  -0.5242  -0.5401  -0.4739  -0.4856  -0.5040  -0.4576  -0.3755   31 
Appendix Table A-1: Selected EU National Health Care Systems, Demand and Supply Side Regulations 
  SUPPLY-SIDE  DEMAND-SIDE 
CTRY:  NATIONAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS  PRICING  REIMBURSEMENT 
PRESCRIBING, DISPENSING 
AND CONSUMPTION 




Free pricing:  
-Applies to in-patent drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to multi-sourced drugs
2 
-Doesn’t apply to OTC 
Price freedom for new products (since 1995)  a)  Reference price for off-patent sector (1989) 
b)  Drug budgets (re-introduced 1999) 
c)  Negative list (1983) 
d)  Positive list (since 2001) 
a) Negative list (1983) 
b) Budget (Funded by National) 
c) Guidelines/Monitoring 
d) Generic Prescribing 
e) Substitution 
f) Incentives 
g) Co-Payment: Flat fee per pack 
UK  The National Health Service  
REGULATORY APPROACH:  
Cost-Effectiveness Pricing and  
Profit Controls: 
-Applies to in-patent drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to multi-sourced drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to OTC 
a)  Agreement with industry on profit control 
b)  Price cut (4.5%) 
c)  Free price modulation by 2001 
d)  “Maximum Price Scheme” for generics 
(2000)  
a)  Negative list 
b)   Practice and prescribing guidelines 
 
a) Negative list 
b) Budget (Funded by National) 
c) Guidelines/Monitoring 
d) Generic Prescribing 
e) Incentives 
f) Co-payment: Flat fee per item  
FR  The Statuary Health Insurance  
REGULATORY APPROACH:  
Fixed Pricing and Cost-Effectiveness 
Pricing:  
-Applies to in-patent drugs 
-Applies to multi-sourced drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to OTC 
a)  Price fixing through negotiation 
b)  Comparisons with other European countries 
for “innovative” products 
c)  Periodic price reductions for new and 
expensive products  
d)  Price freedom has been introduced since 2003 
a)  Committee decides on reimbursable prices on 
advice from Transparency committee 
b)  Positive list 
c)  Medical references 
d)  Targets for “gate-keeping” (General Practitioners) 
e)  Pharmacoeconomic guidelines under development 
f)  Prices of generics 30% lower than original (1998) 
a) Positive list 
b) Budget (Funded by National) 
c) Guidelines/Monitoring 
d) Generic prescribing 
e) Substitution 
f) Incentives 
g) Co-payment: %  (0, 35, 65) 
ITY  The National Health Service  
REGULATORY APPROACH:  
Fixed Pricing and Cost-Effectiveness 
Pricing:  
-Applies to  in-patent drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to multi-sourced drugs 
-Doesn’t apply to OTC 
a)  Average European Price (EU countries) for 
“old” products and products registered with 
the national procedure (Altered: 1998) 
b)  Price negotiation (contractual model) for new 
and innovative products 
c)  Price freedom for non-reimbursable drugs 
d)  Generics are priced at least 20% below the 
original 
e)  Frequent use of price cuts/freezes   
a)  Positive list 
b)  Reference listing and same prices for same drugs’ 
principle for off-patent drugs 
c)  Formal requirement for economic evaluation 
during price negotiations 
d)  Guidelines and protocols defined and managed at 
local level 
e)  Official earmarked budget for innovative drugs 
introduced in 1998 
a) Positive list 
b) Budget (Funded by Regional) 
c) Guidelines/Monitoring 
d) Substitution 
e) Co-payment: % (0, 50, 100) 
+flat fee 
SPN  The Statuary Health Insurance 
REGULATORY APPROACH:  
Fixed Pricing:  
-Applies to in-patent drugs 
-Applies to multi-sourced drugs 
-Applies to OTC 
a)  Price control through negotiation on a cost-
plus basis 
b)  International price comparisons 
c)  Price-volume agreement for expensive 
products 
a)  Positive list 
b)  Negative list (1998) 
c)  Reference pricing for estimating maximum 
reimbursement for multi-source products 
a) Negative AND Positive list 
b) Guidelines/Monitoring 
c) Generic prescribing 
d) Co-payment: % up to a max. 
per item price (0, 10, 40) 
 
Adapted from (Kanavos 2001) and compiled from (Seget 2003), (Mossialos, et al. 2004) 
 
                                                 
1 Summary of general approach to regulation of pharmaceutical prices, (Mrazek 2002).  
2 Brand name drugs that have generic equivalents. 
 